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CIVIL RIGHTS
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION UNDER TITLE VII - MEMBERSHIP QUOTA AS A
PERMISSIBLE REMEDY
EEOC v. Local 638 ... Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers'
International Association
Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' a civil
action may be instituted against a labor union or joint labor-
management apprenticeship committee for utilizing racially dis-
criminatory standards in their admission practices.2 Although the
courts have had little difficulty in determining what constitutes
discrimination in employment practices 3 and the elements neces-
sary to prove a Title VII action,4 the nature and scope of statutory
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Title VII proscribes employment
practices which discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. §
2000e-2. Additionally, § 2000e-2(a)(2) makes it unlawful for an employer to "adversely affect"
an individual's employment status or "to limit. . . or classify his employees or applicants"
in any manner that "would . ..tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties." See generally Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1972).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c), (d) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) precludes any labor organization or
committee conducting union training programs from discriminating on the basis of race
against its members or applicants for membership.
Employment decisions based solely on race, sex, or religion which had an injurious
effect on an individual were quickly found to be discriminatory. See, e.g., United States v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 471 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973) (prior
to enactment of Title VII employer maintained segregated work areas which had the continu-
ing effect of denying blacks promotion opportunities and- equal pay); Riley v. Bendix Corp.,
464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972) (unlawful employment practice to fire employee who refused to
work a Friday night shift because his religion forbade it). In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971) the Supreme Court held that Title VII proscribes employment practices
which, although fair on their face, are discriminatory in operation. Thus, the courts are
sensitive to both overt acts of discrimination and seemingly innocent employment and promo-
tion requirements which in effect discriminatorily bar minorities. For examples of employ-
ment practices found to be discriminatory, see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425-36 (1975) (use of nonjob-related tests to determine promotion eligibility); Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1370-73 (5th Cir. 1974) (educational require-
ments and tests); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 364 (8th Cir. 1973) (hiring
and promotion systems); United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973) (denial of work permits to nonmembers of union); United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 655-56 (2d Cir. 1971) (seniority and transfer
provisions); Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1049-50
(5th Cir. 1969) (union membership criteria).
I The initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination rests upon
the complainant. In McDonell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), the Supreme
Court established a four-point standard which must be met to establish a prima facie case.
Under the McDonnell test, the plaintiff must demonstrate "that he belongs to a racial minor-
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and discretionary remedies5 available to redress past discrimination
have not been precisely delineated. As a result of inconsistencies
within the statute itself' and an absence of clear congressional in-
ity;" that he applied and was qualified for the job in question; that he was rejected; and "that,
after his rejection, the position remained open" and the defendant sought further applications
from individuals with plaintiff's qualifications. Id. at 802, discussed in, Belton, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and Judicial Developments,
20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 225, 247, 250 (1976) [hereinafter cited as A Decade of Developments].
Statistics showing the racial composition of defendant's work force may also be used to
establish a prima facie case. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971), minorities
comprised less than 15% of the defendant's work force. As a prerequisite to promotion, the
defendant required that employees have a high school diploma. Id. at 427-28. The Court
compared the percentage of white males in North Carolina who graduated from high school
(34%) with the percentage of black males who graduated (12%), id. at 430 n.6, and concluded
that such a requirement was discriminatory unless the defendant could show it was related
to job performance. Id. at 431-32. The use of statistics to establish discrimination in employ-
ment practices is now common. See, e.g., Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387,
392-93 (2d Cir. 1973) (white applicants passed entrance exams 2.8 to l over black applicants);
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
984 (1971) (union membership .001% black while local city population 7% black). See
generally G. COOPER, H. RABB & H. RUBIN, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 131-32 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as COOPER]; A Decade of Developments, supra, at 250-53.
* Upon a finding that the defendant intentionally engaged in an unlawful practice, Title
VII specifically empowers the court to enjoin such practice and order the hiring or reinstate-
ment of employees, with or without backpay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975). An
award of backpay serves to deter the defendant from engaging in further discriminatory
practices. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975). In awarding
backpay, the courts have been forced to determine which plaintiffs are entitled to relief and
the period of time for which they should be compensated. See, e.g., EEOC v. Steamfitters
Local 638 (Rios), 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976) (subject to three-year statute of limitations
backpay may be awarded only to those deterred from applying for membership by a union's
discriminatory reputation); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.
1974) (backpay awarded to those injured by discriminatory educational requirements and
transfer provisions). Section 2000e-5(g) was amended in 1972 to include within the scope of
the district court's powers the use of "any other equitable relief," and to impose a two-year
statute of limitations on backpay claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975), quoted in
note 30 infra.
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Supreme Court characterized
congressional intent behind the 1972 amendment as a desire to vest the courts with discretion-
ary powers to enable them to pragmatically fashion the most appropriate and complete relief
demanded by the circumstances. Id. at 419-21. The purpose of the relief is to restore victims
of discriminatory practices to the positions in which they would have been were it not for the
discrimination. Id.; 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams). See generally
Note, Constitutionality of Remedial Minority Preferences in Employment, 56 MINN. L. REv.
842 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Minority Preferences].
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970) establish two
seemingly contradictory policy objectives in implementing remedies under Title VII. See
notes 29-30 and accompanying text infra. Section 2000e-5(g) empowers the district court,
upon a finding of a Title VII violation, to order any suitable affirmative action or other
equitable relief. Section 2000e-2(j) states that Title VII is not to be construed as requiring an
employer or labor union to give preferential treatment to any individual to correct a racial
imbalance. The effect of these two sections is to recognize affirmative action as a proper relief
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tent,7 the formulation of appropriate relief in Title VII actions has
not been a simple task. The courts have had particular difficulty in
rectifying past discrimination while at the same time avoiding im-
position of a remedy which results in reverse discrimination." Re-
cently, in EEOC v. Local 638. . . Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers'
International Association,9 the Second Circuit was presented with
an opportunity to reconcile these policy considerations. In Sheet
Metal Workers, the Second Circuit held that when a union is partic-
ularly recalcitrant in complying with less stringent enforcement
methods, the imposition of a minority membership goal is an appro-
priate and necessary remedy.10
Local 28 is an unincorporated labor union for journeymen and
apprentice sheet metal workers.'I Maintaining jurisdiction over New
York City, Local 28 effectively exercises total control over the com-
position of the sheet metal trade labor force within the five bor-
oughs.'2 As of July 1974, Local 28's minority membership was ap-
while at the same time proscribing any preferential treatment. Affirmative relief, however,
need not involve preferential treatment. It may include hiring, promotion, or transfer of the
petitioner and the award of compensatory and punitive damages. See generally 2 A. LARSON,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 55.10-.43 (1975). See also Employment Discrimination: A
Title VII Symposium, 34 LA. L. REV. 540, 552-63 (1974).
The tension between these two sections becomes apparent when the courts impose a
membership goal. Imposition of a remedial quota is supportable under the power granted to
the courts by section 2000e-5(g) to order any affirmative relief deemed necessary. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975). The use of a membership goal, however, may result in
preferential treatment to minority individuals, which is violative of section 2000e-2(j). See
Edwards & Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies For Employment Discrimination, 74 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1975).
7 Although Congress seemed opposed to the use of quotas when the Civil Rights Act was
first passed in 1964, see 110 CONG. REC. 7218 (1964) (remarks of Sens. Clark and Johnston),
Congress later appeared to endorse such action when it rejected a proposed 1972 amendment
proscribing remedial quotas under Title VII. See Goldman, The Next Ten Years: Title VII
Confronts the Constitution, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 308, 325 (1976). See generally S. REP. No.
872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), and H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted
in 11964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2355.
See, e.g., United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 525 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1975)
(trial court erred in modifying seniority system without considering the resulting injury that
new system might have on nonminority employees); Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 404 F. Supp.
1022, 1029 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (court noted the objections to reverse discrimination when order-
ing a hiring and promotion quota for blacks and women). But cf., EEOC v. Elevator Con-
structors Local 5, 398 F. Supp. 1237, 1256-57 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (membership goal upheld as
not violating Title VII's prohibition against preferential treatment).
532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'g 401 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
532 F.2d at 830.
Id. at 823-24.
12 Id. Moreover, "a nonwhite had never been an officer of Local 28 or a member of its
Executive Board." 401 F. Supp. at 472.
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proximately three percent of a total membership of about 3500.' 3
The primary method of entry into Local 28 is by graduation from
its apprentice program. This program is administered by the Joint
Apprenticeship Committee (JAC), a group composed of representa-
tives of Local 28 and the Contractors' Association. 4 In July 1974,
minority representation in the apprenticeship training program was
fourteen percent of the program's total enrollment.' 5
In a proceeding instituted in 1964 by the New York State Com-
mission for Human Rights,'" Local 28 and the JAC had been found
to have engaged in discriminatory recruitment and membership
practices. As a result of that proceeding, the New York supreme
court ordered that, pursuant to a detailed agreement of the parties,
admission tests for the apprentice training program be administered
by a professional testing center and that applicants be selected
solely on the basis of their qualifications. 7 When Local 28 and the
JAC continued their discriminatory admission practices, the EEOC
brought an action in federal district court'8 alleging such discrimina-
tion effectively blocked all avenues of union admission to minori-
ties.'9 The district court held that Local 28 had illegally prevented
, 401 F. Supp. at 472-73.
' 532 F.2d at 824.
, 401 F. Supp. at 475. Similarly, the JAC had never had a minority member. Id. at 474.
" State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Farrell, 43 Misc. 2d 958, 252 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1964). The Farrell court noted that the only realistic means of entering Local
28 was upon completion of the JAC program. It found that acceptance into the apprentice
training program was determined by the use of subjective criteria. Id. at 960-61, 252 N.Y.S.2d
at 652-53. Reasoning that these criteria contained no safeguards against discriminatory ad-
mission practices, the court concluded that they be eliminated and replaced by objective
standards. Id. at 960, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
, Id. at 968, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
" 532 F.2d at 824. The action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970) and
was originally instituted by the Justice Department in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York. The EEOC was substituted as plaintiff and the City of
New York was permitted to join as plaintiff-intervenor. 532 F.2d at 824 n.2.
The proceeding was originally brought against several New York City construction un-
ions and their respective apprenticeship programs. 532 F.2d at 824. Since the various unions
were granted separate trials, Local 28, its JAC, and the Sheet Metal Contractors' Associa-
tion were the only remaining defendant-appellants. Id. The Contractors' Association was not
charged with a violation of Title VII, but was joined in the action as an indispensable party
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). 532 F.2d at 824 n.3.
11 See Brief for Appellee at 19-20, 23-25, EEOC v. Local 638. . . Local 28, Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976). Admission to Local 28 is achieved either
upon graduation from the apprenticeship program, by-transferring from a "sister" union, by
passing "a battery of journeyman-level tests, without formal apprentice training," or by prior
membership in another union. 532 F.2d at 825. Admission to the union can also be achieved
when Local 28 organizes a nonunion shop and the workers' employer certifies that they are
capable of working at journeyman level. Id. In addition, Local 28 occasionally issues tempo-
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minority participation in its apprenticeship programs, and thus,
denied access to the attendant employment opportunities. '0 Finding
that the JAC's admission tests were not valid indicia of future job
performance,2' the district court enjoined their further use. Addi-
rary work permits to nonunion members. Id. The charges of discrimination were based on
several union actions. For example, the union denied work permits to all minorities and
accepted only nonminority transferees. Id. at 826-27. Additionally, union-funded "cram"
courses for the apprenticeship program admission examinations were offered to the sons and
nephews of union members, id. at 826, and since 1959 Local 28 had given only two journeymen
tests despite the 1967-1972 construction boom. 401 F. Supp. at 484. Moreover, as the Second
Circuit noted, the admission tests for the apprenticeship training program were discrimina-
tory. 532 F.2d at 825-26.
21 401 F. Supp. at 487.
21 Id. at 480-81. In Griggs v. Duke Power Cb., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), the Supreme Court
proscribed the use of employment criteria which, although facially neutral, operate to dis-
criminate against minorities unless it can be shown that the criteria are job related. Once
the petitioner has established a prima facie case of discrimination, it becomes incumbent
upon the respondent to show that employment testing or other criteria are job related. See
id. at 432. Cf. Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 73 (1976) (action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970)). It is
the defendant's burden to demonstrate that the results of the examinations utilized are valid
indicia of future job performance. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 & n.14 (1973); NAACP v.
Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1019-26 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1371-73 & nn.17 & 24 (5th Cir. 1974). The
defendant's burden is based upon a sliding scale: the poorer the quality of the test, the greater
must be the showing of valid job-relatedness. Cf. Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 490 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1973) (action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
For an in depth discussion of the standards by which the validity of admission tests may be
determined, see COOPER, supra note 4, at 132-38. If the defendant cannot show job-
relatedness, he may instead demonstrate that he had no other suitable hiring alternative. See
29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1976).
Section 2000e-2(h) of Title VII provides that an employer may use the results of "any
professionally developed ability test" as long as such test is not used for discriminatory
purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). The EEOC has promulgated guidelines to determine
whether an employee ability test is a valid aid in recruiting and maintaining an efficient labor
force. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1976). The guidelines require that there must be a
statistically significant relationship between the examination and at least one relevant aspect
of work performance. Id. § 1607.5(c)(1). The EEOC guidelines have been accorded great
deference in interpreting test validity. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
430-36 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); A Decade of Develop-
ments, supra note 3, at 267-73. But see Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimina-
tion and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. Ray. 1109, 1120-40 (1971)
(guidelines are too narrow and stringent). See generally CooPa, supra note 4, at 151-52.
Relying on Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 423 (1975), and Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), the Sheet Metal Workers district court considered it
well settled that employment tests which have a discriminatory impact on minority individu-
als can only be upheld upon a showing of job-relatedness. 401 F. Supp. at 478. While Title
VII seeks to protect bona fide nondiscriminatory tests, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970); 110
CONG. REC. 7212-13 (1964) (Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII submitted by Sens.
Clark and Case), the court found that the defendants could not clearly demonstrate that their
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tionally, the court ordered that one of the three JAC representatives
be replaced by a minority member,2 and that the union attain
twenty-nine percent minority membership by 1981 .23 The court also
ordered the appointment of an administrator 4 to supervise Local
28's efforts to comply with its decree, and directed that backpay 5
be awarded to those individuals who could produce documentary
evidence2 1 that they had suffered from past union discrimination.
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the appellants contested both
the district court's factual findings of past discrimination and the
nature of the remedies imposed.2 After quickly determining that
the district court's findings of fact were not "clearly erroneous,12
the major task before the Second Circuit consisted of an evaluation
of the propriety of the district court's remedies. In attempting to
balance the conflicting objectives of eradicating past discrimination
through the use of remedial goals while avoiding reverse discrimina-
tion against nonminority individuals, the Sheet Metal Workers
admission examinations were significantly job-related, and therefore enjoined their use. 401
F. Supp. at 480-81. The district court also enjoined the requirement of a high school diploma
since defendants did not show that it was job-related. Id. at 482. While an educational
requirement such as a high school diploma is not specifically dealt with in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(h) (1970), it does fall within the purview of the EEOC guidelines. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2
(1976).
2 401 F. Supp. at 490.
1 Id. at 489. The district court found that approximately 29% of the relevant work force
in New York City was composed of minority individuals, id., and allowed six years in which
to meet the goal because of the depressed economy, id. at 489 n.30.
24 Id. at 489. The appointment of an administrator is one of the most effective weapons
in the arsenal of remedies possessed by the district court. An administrator provides regular
contact between the court and the parties, serves as a source of objective expertise to assist
the court, and possesses the requisite ability to handle both unforeseen and day-to-day
problems in implementing court orders. See Harris, The Title VII Administrator: A Case
Study in Judicial Flexibility, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 53, 55 (1974). For situations involving court
appointed administrators, see Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974)
(appointment of administrator to sit on court ordered board of examiners); United States v.
Wood Wire & Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973)
(enforcement of administrator's recommendations); United States v. Local 86, Int'l Ass'n of
Ironworkers, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970), af'd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 984 (1971).
2 401 F. Supp. at 491. The backpay award was ordered to be computed from the date of
discrimination to the date the court's decision was filed or the date of union admission,
whichever was earlier. Id.
26 Id.
" 532 F.2d at 824.
2 Id. at 827. The Sheet Metal Workers court found.ample evidence to support the district
court, and indeed, stated that the appellants did not seriously contest the factual findings of
discrimination. Id. In support of the district court's factual conclusions, the Second Circuit
noted the union's long history of racial discrimination and its continued pattern of employ-
ment discrimination. Id. at 824-27. See note 19 supra.
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court noted the apparent contrariety between section 2000e-2(j) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,29 which explicitly prohibits preferential
treatment as a means of rectifying racial imbalance, and section
2000e-5(g) of that Act,30 which grants the district courts discretion-
ary power to impose appropriate affirmative relief to correct past
discrimination.3 Pursuant to section 2000e-5(g), several district
courts have imposed membership goals to remedy racial imbalances
created by past discriminatory employment practices.32 Such relief,
however, will often cause a reverse discriminatory impact on nonmi-
nority individuals and thereby apparently violate the proscription
against preferential treatment embodied in section 2000e-2(j). The
tension between these considerations is exemplified by past Second
Circuit decisions which, while imposing membership quotas, have
done so with reluctance.3
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970) states in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer,
• . . labor organization, or joint labor-management committee. . . to grant prefer-
ential treatment to any individual . . . because of the race, [or] color . . . of such
individual . . . on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the
total number or percentage of persons of any race, [or] color . . . admitted to
membership . . . by any labor organization . . . [or in] any apprenticeship or
other training program ....
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975), states in pertinent part:
[Tihe court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in . . . unlawful employ-
ment practice[s], and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which
may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay. . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
1' 532 F.2d at 827. See note 6 supra.
31 See, e.g., Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd sub
nor. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Vogler v. McCarthy, Inc.,
294 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost
Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
3 As was noted by the Sheet Metal Workers court, a remedial goal was first imposed
upon a public employer in the Second Circuit only after a finding of past discrimination and
a failure to take positive steps to eliminate the effects of such discrimination. 532 F.2d at
827-28. See Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of the Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n,
482 F.2d 1333, 1340-41 (2d Cir. 1973). Although not a Title VII action, Bridgeport involved
discriminatory hiring methods of the Bridgeport civil service police department. Id. at 1334.
The Second Circuit approved the use of remedial goals "somewhat gingerly." Id. at 1340. The
court nonetheless affirmed a 15% hiring quota on the grounds that such a figure was not
excessive compared to the local minority population of 25%, and that it was especially impor-
tant for a police department to have visible minority membership. Id. at 1341. The court,
however, reversed a quota imposed by the district court for promotion to ranks above patrol-
man. Id. By suggesting that the nonminorities who would be affected by such a goal would
already be on the police force and seeking advancement, see id., the Bridgeport court fore-
shadowed the standard for imposing remedial quotas which was later established in Kirkland
v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 73 (1976), discussed in notes 34-36 and accompanying text infra. It must be noted that
recently the Supreme Court, in Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976), has overruled
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In 1975, the Second Circuit, in Kirkland v. New York State
Department of Correctional Services,34 sought to minimize the re-
verse discriminatory effect of membership goals by establishing a
two-part test which must be satisfied before such quotas may be
imposed. Satisfaction of the Kirkland test requires first that there
exist a "clear-cut pattern of long-continued and egregious racial
discrimination," 3 5 and second, that any reverse discrimination
which will result from the imposition of the quota not be
"identifiable," i.e., affecting a comparatively small group of known
nonminority individuals.3 1
Applying the Kirkland test, the Sheet Metal Workers court
unanimously reversed the district court order mandating the re-
placement of one of the three JAC trustees with a minority member,
since the JAC representative who would be replaced was clearly
"identifiable. '37 Turning then to the propriety of issuing an order
public employment cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970), such as
Bridgeport, to the extent that these cases held that an employment practice which resulted
in a disproportionate racial impact was sufficient in itself to sustain a finding of discrimina-
tion. See 96 S. Ct. at 2047, 2050 & n.12. The Court in Washington held that under the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause discrimination does not exist without a
finding of discriminatory intent on the part of the employer. Id. at 2047.
In a subsequent case involving Title VII, a sharply divided Second Circuit panel ex-
panded the use of quotas to private employers after a finding that only such a remedy could
effectively remove the effects of past discrimination. Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d
622, 630-31 (2d Cir. 1974). The Rios district court's imposition of a membership goal was
affirmed by the Second Circuit, with a particularly strong dissent by Judge Hays. The
majority believed that the use of quotas as affirmative action under § 2000e-5(g) was not
prohibited by § 2000e-2(j), which bars preferential treatment. Id. at 630-31. See note 6 supra.
Judge Hays, however, persuasively argued that the use of quotas directly contradicted legisla-
tive intent. See 501 F.2d at 634-37 (Hays, J., dissenting). He concluded that under no circum-
stances does Title VII permit the use of an order to attain a certain racial percentage, be it
called a "goal" or a "quota." Id. at 634 & n.1.
34 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 73 (1976). The Kirkland court
disapproved a permanent quota which would have required that preferential treatment be
granted to minority individuals who had passed a civil service examination. 520 F.2d at 428.
520 F.2d at 427.
,' Id. The Kirkland test was foreshadowed by the decision of Rios v. Steamfitters Local
638, 501 F.2d 622, 631 (2d Cir. 1974), where the Second Circuit required that a long history
of egregious racial discrimination be shown before a quota can be imposed. The Kirkland case
added the requirement that nonminority individuals who would be affected by the use of a
quota cannot be identifiable. 520 F.2d at 427.
11 532 F.2d at 830. The problem of "bumping" and its reverse discriminatory effect is
most frequently associated with an award of retroactive seniority. See, e.g., Chance v. Board
of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976); Gamble v. Birmingham S.R.R., 514 F.2d 678, 685
(5th Cir. 1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of the Bridgeport Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1341 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally Note, Retroactive Seniority as a
Remedy for Past Discrimination: Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 51 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 181 (1976).
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requiring an overall membership goal for Local 28 and the appren-
ticeship program, the court concluded that such a goal was justified
in view of the union's long history of past discrimination .3  The
Second Circuit reasoned that since the identity of those applicants
who would be denied admission to the training program could not
easily be ascertained, a temporary admission quota was not objec-
tionable under the Kirkland standard.39 Judge Feinberg, in a con-
curring opinion, felt constrained in light of Second Circuit prece-
dent upholding the use of remedial quotas to affirm the imposition
of such a sanction in this case." He questioned the basic validity of
imposing quotas, however, even as circumscribed under the
Kirkland standard, since they appear to belie the Title VII proscrip-
tion against preferential treatment."
Although affirming the imposition of an overall membership
quota on Local 28, the Second Circuit specifically forbade an at-
tempt to implement this directive by imposing a quota on accept-
ances to the apprenticeship program.12 Approving the order which
required nondiscriminatory tests to be developed under EEOC
guidelines 3 and administered after extensive minority recruit-
ment,44 the majority held that to avoid illegal reverse discrimina-
532 F.2d at 830.
Id. The majority distinguished an entry level quota, the effect of which is dispersed
among an unknown and not clearly defined group of potential applicants from the situation
where a goal in a seniority or promotion system operates against presently employed nonmi-
norities who are readily recognizable. Id.
Id. at 833 (Feinberg, J., concurring).
Id. at 833-34. Judge Feinberg stressed that the prohibition against "preferential treat-
ment" contained in § 2000e-2(j) cannot be ignored. Id. at 833. He maintained that although
§ 2000e-2(j) bars quotas, it does not bar other broad relief consistent with the purposes of
Title VII, such as granting relief directly to individuals who have proven discrimination. Id.
at 834. Judge Feinberg had previously expressed his disapproval of quotas in Patterson v.
Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767, 776 (2d Cir.) (Feinberg, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3198 (1976). There, although he concurred in the use of quotas, he did
so only because the quotas were temporary and because he did not want to disturb a settle-
ment agreement that afforded benefits to nonminorities. His opinion in the Sheet Metal
Workers decision closely parallels his concurrence in Patterson. In both, he cautioned against
the use of racial quotas, and in Patterson he labeled such quotas as "inherently obnoxious
• . . demeaning and divisive . . . [and] a lesser evil . . . not to be encouraged." 514 F.2d
at 776. Judge Feinberg in his concurring opinions in both Sheet Metal Workers, 532 F.2d at
833, and Patterson, 501 F.2d at 776, relied upon Judge Hays' dissent in Rios v. Steamfitters
Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 634 (2d Cir. 1974) (Hays, J., dissenting), where he declared quotas
to be violative of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
11 532 F.2d at 830-32. The plan establishing a ratio of minority and nonminority admis-
sions into the apprenticeship program was created by the court appointed administrator and
the defendants. Id. at 831 & n.5.
13 Id. at 831 (Smith, J.). See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
" 532 F.2d at 830-31. The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that where there
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tion, as defined under the Kirkland test, the results of these neutral,
nondiscriminatory examinations must be the sole criteria for admis-
sion." The court concluded that to require the use of objective non-
discriminatory tests and then disregard the results to achieve a
racial ratio among the entrants would result in an adverse effect on
identifiable, qualified, nonminority applicants. 6
Judge Smith, however, voicing his dissent within the majority
opinion he authored, believed such a ratio to be appropriate tempo-
rary affirmative action under section 2000e-5(g) .7 He admitted that
with the relatively small number of openings, nonminority individu-
als who may be "bumped" to maintain the ratio could easily be
identified. 8 Nevertheless, he found that in light of past Second
Circuit decisions,49 the imposition of a quota was permissible to
was a past pattern of discriniination, recruitment methods which would usually be considered
acceptable and nondiscriminatory would not be sufficient. Id. at 830-31. In such a case, more
extensive recruitment is required to eliminate the impact of previous discrimination. 401 F.
Supp. at 490 n.31, citing Gresham v. Chambers, 501 F.2d 687, 691 (2d Cir. 1974).
11 532 F.2d at 831. Congress did not intend that unqualified minorities be afforded job
opportunities over qualified nonminorities. See 110 CONG. REc. 6000-01 (1964) (remarks of
Sens. Humphrey and Smathers). The courts have given effect to this intent. See, e.g., Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971); NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1027 (1st
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 618-19 (5th Cir.
1974).
11 532 F.2d at 831. The majority held that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) and Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) mandate that results which are a product of job-related
racially neutral tests must be respected. 532 F.2d at 831.
' 532 F.2d at 831-32.
' Id. at 831.
Id. at 831-32. Judge Smith agreed with Judge Mansfield's dissent in Kirkland v. New
York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 531 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield, J., dissenting)
(denial of petition for rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 73 (1976). There, Judge
Mansfield maintained that the imposition of a permanent quota was within the proper discre-
tion of the district court and was the only adequate remedy available. 531 F.2d at 7, 9. He
stated that the temporary adverse impact on nonminorities was necessary to redress aggrieved
minorities. Id. at 10.
Judge Smith also compared the situation in Sheet Metal Workers to that of Bridgeport
Guardians, Inc. v. Members of the Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.
1973), where a hiring quota was imposed. See 532 F.2d at 831. It is submitted that Judge
Smith's reliance on Bridgeport is misplaced since the considerations which persuaded the
Bridgeport court to affirm the order of a quota were not present in Sheet Metal Workers. The
panel in Bridgeport noted that remedial quotas discriminate because minorities are treated
preferentially solely as a result of their race. 482 F.2d at 1340. The panel "somewhat gingerly"
affirmed the district court's order of a quota and emphasized that perhaps the most crucial
consideration in its decision was that respondent was a governmental rather than a private
employer. Id. at 1340-41. Stressing the fact that this'was not merely a situation where the
court was creating equal employment opportunities for minorities, the Bridgeport court
pointed out that visible minority membership in the respondent police department would aid
effective law enforcement during a period of racial tension and thus would benefit the public
as a whole. Id. at 1341. See note 33 supra.
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correct the racial imbalance created by the union's past discrimina-
tion. 0 Indeed, he stated that an entry level quota was one of the
most effective methods available to rectify within a reasonable time
the dearth of minority workers in the local labor force."
Although failing to reach unanimous agreement on all aspects
of the remedial action taken by the district court, the entire Second
Circuit bench did agree to expand the class of those eligible for an
award of backpay.52 The district court had limited this relief to those
applicants who could produce documentary evidence of their appli-
cation for admission to the union and subsequent rejection based on
discriminatory grounds. 3 Relying on Supreme Court authority, 54 the
Second Circuit noted that to affirm the district court's order would
emasculate the dual purpose of "remediation and deterrence" which
such an award is designed to effectuate. 5 Furthermore, the court
' 532 F.2d at 832.
Id. at 831-32. In affirming the use of a mathematical quota and concurrently rejecting
a ratio for admissions, the action taken by the divided Sheet Metal Workers court reflects
the ambivalence evidenced in congressional action.
52 Id. at 832-33.
5 401 F. Supp. at 491.
51 The Sheet Metal Workers court relied upon the recent Supreme Court case of Albe-
marle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), which established a standard to govern the
award of backpay. See 532 F.2d at 832. The Albemarle Court stated: "[Gliven a finding of
unlawful discrimination, back pay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied gener-
ally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination through-
out the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination."
422 U.S. at 421 (footnote omitted). In Albemarle, backpay was held to be a proper award to
those employees injured by discriminatory employment testing and promotion practices. Id.
at 422-24. The Court noted that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975) specifically provides
that backpay is a remedy which a court may deny if it deems it inappropriate in any particu-
lar case. 422 U.S. at 415-16 & n.9. The Albemarle Court found that Congress intended to
further the objectives of Title VII by including backpay as part of the courts' power to order
any affirmative action or equitable relief considered proper. Id. at 415-16. Besides providing
compensation for victims of discrimination, the Court reasoned backpay serves to deter the
defendant from any future violations of Title VII. Id. at 417-18.
The district court in Sheet Metal Workers noted that an award based on testimonial
evidence would so broaden the scope of the award that the union would be subjected to an
inequitable financial liability. See 401 F. Supp. at 491. The Second Circuit, however, relying
upon Albemarle, concluded that to deny backpay to discriminatees with oral evidence would
frustrate the objectives of Title VII. See note 56 and accompanying text infra.
In expanding the scope of the award to encompass discriminatees with oral evidence
irrespective of the financial impact on the defendants, the Second Circuit foreshadowed its
later decision in EEOC v. Steamfitters Local 638 (Rios), 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976). The
defendant union in Steam fitters (Rios) contended that compliance with the backpay award
might force the union into bankruptcy. Id. at 585-86. Finding no evidence that the union faced
"imminent financial distress," the Steamfitters (Rios) court held the union liable to the full
extent of the award. Additionally, the court noted that the union had benefited financially
from its past discriminatory policies. Id. at 586-87.
:4 532 F.2d at 832.
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observed, limiting the evidence of discrimination to documentary
proof would award the union's unjustifiable failure to keep records.56
The Sheet Metal Workers court therefore modified the district
court's order authorizing backpay by expanding the class of recipi-
ents eligible to include discriminatees possessing only testimonial
proof of discrimination.5 7
The Second Circuit's analysis of the district court's remedies is
clearly in accord with prior case law.18 Moreover, the Sheet Metal
5 Id. Both 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (Supp. V 1975) and the EEOC guidelines promulgated
pursuant to this section, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1602.20-.21 (1976), require labor organizations and
joint labor organization committees to keep and preserve records of applications. See United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 548 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
1 532 F.2d at 832-33. The Sheet Metal Workers court refused, however, to broaden the
backpay award to include potential applicants since such an expansion would make the
resulting damages too speculative. Id. at 832-33 & n.6. The panel distinguished this case from
Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1976), where female police officers were granted
retroactive or constructive seniority upon showing that they were deterred from applying for
a position because of knowledge of the respondent's discriminatory hiring practices. 532 F.2d
at 833 n.6. The Sheet Metal Workers panel concluded that the scope of the award should not
be expanded to include potential applicants since the remedy of backpay is a greater burden
upon the defendant than that of retroactive seniority. Id. Additionally, the retroactive senior-
ity in Acha was granted to those previously deterred applicants who were later hired once
the defendants had stopped discriminating. Id. The Sheet Metal Workers court noted that a
backpay award to potential applicants in this instance could not be so restricted. Id. More-
over, the court stated the broader remedy in Acha was sustained because the discriminatory
policy was officially announced, while in Sheet Metal Workers the defendant's discrimination
was covert and known only through rumors of unfairness. Id.
5 By requiring extensive minority recruitment prior to administering annual admission
examinations, 532 F.2d at 830-31, the Second Circuit has extended the Supreme Court deci-
sions which mandated only that such tests be a valid indication of job performance ability.
See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). For a discussion of these cases, see note 21 supra. Such an order, however,
is indeed most appropriate when dealing with a union whose past history more than amply
demonstrates its recalcitrance in conforming its admission practices to Title VII, and is a
legitimate exercise of the court's broad equitable discretion. See note 5 supra. In approving
this order, the Second Circuit has wisely followed the recent trend of other circuits. See, e.g.,
United States v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ironworkers
Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 548 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); cf. NAACP v. Allen,
493 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1974) (statewide recruitment ordered in non-Title VII action).
Moreover, the Sheet Metal Workers majority decision mandating that admission to the
training program be based solely on the results of a neutral nondiscriminatory test rather than
on a ratio of minority to majority applicants is in accord with the Kirkland test, while Judge
Smith's dissenting view is not. See text accompanying notes 43-51 supra. It is submitted that
the nonminority group which has taken the admissions test is sufficiently identifiable so as
to preclude the use of such a ratio. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
Additionally, the Second Circuit noted that to replace a JAC trustee with a minority
individual would also contravene the Kirkland test forbidding such a remedy when the result
would be "bumping" an identifiable nonminority. 532 F.2d at 830-31. See notes 34-36 and
accompanying text supra. To allow such a replacement would clearly contravene the import
of circuit court authority that no preferential treatment be given to minorities in fashioning
a remedy. See, e.g., Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420,
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Workers court's approval of the overall remedial quota only after
determining that it satisfied the Kirkland standard is in accord with
the Second Circuit's policy of circumscribing the use of membership
goals. 9 Nonetheless, it is submitted that the imposition of the over-
all quota was unnecessary. While the Kirkland test was satisfied in
Sheet Metal Workers, it would seem that the other remedies ordered
by the court were sufficient not only to prevent future discrimina-
tion, but also to rectify any effects of past discrimination without
the use of a hiring goal. The award of backpay to minority individu-
als who were injured by defendant's discriminatory practices serves
both as a deterrent and as an incentive to Local 28 and the JAC to
refrain from any further violations of Title VII, ° while it also places
the aggrieved individual in as good a position as he would have been
but for the illegal discrimination.' Additionally, the appointment
of an administrator to closely regulate Local 28's testing and admis-
sion procedures will guard against any future discrimination as well
as gradually rectify the racial imbalance created by defendant's
past discrimination. Indeed, the Sheet Metal Workers panel re-
versed the district court's order to replace one of the three JAC
representatives with a minority member, finding it "superfluous in
light of the broad supervisory powers granted to the administra-
tor. '6 2 It should be noted, moreover, that the Sheet Metal Workers
court found the imposition of a quota upon admission to the appren-
ticeship program improper. It is difficult to reconcile this with the
panel's acceptance of an overall membership quota.
Illustrative of a more cautious approach to the problem is the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Harper v. Kloster,3 where the use of
quotas was rejected despite an uncontested finding of pronounced
discrimination. Noting congressional fears that quotas "reinforce
the view that it is the race of the applicants that is important, rather
than their qualifications,"64 the Harper district court employed
428-29 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 73 (1976); Gamble v. Birmingham S.R.R., 514
F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 325 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1972).
' See note 36 supra.
See note 54 supra.
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-21 (1975).
, 532 F.2d at 830.
486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973), afl'g sub nom. Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F.
Supp. 1187 (D. Md.). In Harper, an action was instituted by four black employees alleging
that the City of Baltimore discriminated in the appointment and promotion of firemen. 486
F.2d at 1134.
"1 359 F. Supp. at 1214.
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other remedial action to rectify past discriminatory imbalances in
the labor force. The remedies affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in-
cluded enjoining the use of an invalid examination and voiding
existing eligibility and promotion tests that have had an adverse
impact on blacks."5
Justifying its approval of quotas, the Second Circuit has main-
tained that achieving such goals will not require that less qualified
minority individuals be hired before qualified nonminorities in
order to satisfy the quota.6" Indeed, the Sheet Metal Workers court
expressly found such a proposal to be violative of the Kirkland test. 7
It is interesting to speculate, however, as to what will happen in
1980 if the union realizes that it will be unable to achieve twenty-
nine percent minority membership within the next year. Will this
not be a powerful incentive to the union to admit less qualified
minority applicants over qualified nonminority applicants to
achieve the court-imposed membership percentage by 1981?
Although the Supreme Court has not as yet squarely assessed
the validity of the quota system,68 its recent holding in McDonald
11 486 F.2d at 1135. Additionally, the court mandated that hiring preferences be given
to city residents since the percentage of blacks in Baltimore was higher than that of surround-
ing areas. Id.
11 532 F.2d at 831-32; accord, Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs.,
520 F.2d 420, 428 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 73 (1976); Rios v. Steamfitters Local
638, 501 F.2d 622, 633 (2d Cir. 1974).
'7 532 F.2d at 832. See notes 42-51 and accompanying text supra.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Bakke v. University of
Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976) (en banc), cert. granted, 45
U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-811), where the California Supreme Court held
that a separate and preferential admission standard for minority applicants for medical
school violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and was, therefore,
invalid. In Bakke, the nonminority petitioner had applied to defendant medical school in 1973
and 1974 and had been rejected both times. 18 Cal. 3d at 38, 533 P.2d at 1155, 132 Cal. Rptr.
at 638. The school had 100 seats available for its incoming class and had reserved 16 of those
spaces for minorities. Id. Moreover, the court found that the school's separate minority
admission standard permitted minorities with lower qualifications to be admitted over more
qualified nonminorities. Id.
The Supreme Court previously had an opportunity to rule on the legality of quotas in
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam). There, the nonminority petitioner
was denied entrance to a state law school and sought injunctive relief on the ground that the
school's admissions policy racially discriminated against him. Id. at 314. The school used a
lower admission standard when viewing minority applicants. Id. at 323. The case, however,
was vacated as moot. Id. at 320.
The recent Supreme Court case of Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976),
discussed in Note, Retroactive Seniority as a Remedy for Past Discrimination: Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co., 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 181 (1976), may be indicative of the
approach toward membership goals that the Court will take in analyzing their propriety
under Title VII. In Franks, the Court held that an award of retroactive seniority to those
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v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co. 9 that Title VII proscribes
racial discrimination against nonminorities as well as minorities
would appear to render the legality of this remedy strongly suspect.
In McDonald, two nonminority employees and a minority employee
had been charged with misappropriating cargo. The nonminority
petitioners were fired six days later, but the minority employee was
retained. 0 The Supreme Court reversed a ruling by the Fifth Cir-
cuit which had held that the petitoners did not state a cause of
action under Title VII. 7' Relying upon both congressional intent and
its own prior decisions, the Court found that the purview of Title
VII extends to nonminorities.72
While the proponents of imposing quotas recognize the strong
public policy against reverse discrimination, they nevertheless view
the temporary adverse impact upon nonminorities as necessary to
fulfill the purpose of Title VII. 73 Although the ostensibly contradic-
tory provisions of Title VII would appear to require such an ap-
proach, it is submitted that in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in McDonald the imposition of membership quotas, such as those
individuals who were not hired because of defendant's discriminatory hiring practices was
appropriate affirmative relief under Title VII. 424 U.S. at 770-80. Respondent Bowman had
contended that such an order would injure the interests of employees already in the seniority
system. Id. at 773. The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the primary purpose of
Title VII was to "make-whole" those injured by past discrimination and that this objective
should not be thwarted solely because retroactive seniority decreases other employees' oppor-
tunities for promotion. Id. at 774-75. Should the Court choose to similarly analyze remedial
quotas imposed under Title VII, any argument that the temporary reverse discriminatory
impact precludes their use may well be rejected.
96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976), rev'g 513 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
70 96 S. Ct. at 2576.
7, 513 F.2d at 90-91. There, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the nonminority plaintiff's com-
plaint by simply stating that this was not a claim for which relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) could be granted.
72 96 S. Ct. at 2578.
7 The Second Circuit has stated that a small amount of reverse discrimination resulting
from the imposition of a quota is permissible: "A temporary burdening of Whites. . . is often
necessary to effectively compensate for wrongs done to minority groups. . . . [N]o remedy
is perfect. Each must of necessity require some persons to forego some benefits." Kirkland v.
New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 531 F.2d 5, 10 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting) (denial of petition for rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 73 (1976). See
Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767, 773, 775 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 3198 (1976) (reasonable preference in favor of minority persons is proper);
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 1971) (nonminorities must
tolerate the effects of such relief).
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employed by the Sheet Metal Workers court, is highly question-
able.74
Patricia A. Kurtz
u Even prior to McDonald, the legitimacy of quotas had been questioned. See NAACP
v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir. 1974); Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973),
af'g 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1213 (D. Md.); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 325 (8th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). Commentators are also divided on the question of
the legality of the quota. Compare Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law in Labor
Relations: Three Dimensions of Equal Opportunity, 27 RUTGERs L. REv. 675, 694 (1974), with
Minority Preferences, supra note 5 at 867-68, and COOPER, supra note 4 at 465-66.
